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Abstrat
This paper proposes an analytial formulation of disomfort in mass
transit and disusses its miro-eonomi properties. The formula we in-
trodue reets real situations faed by the passengers, it has nie mathe-
matial properties and it is easy to ompute. The disomfort formulation
is used to analyze optimal sheduling and priing of transit in a dynami
model.
Keywords: publi transport, ongestion disomfort, timetable shedule delay
ost
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1 Introdution
The quality of mass transit and in partiular rowding has beome a severe
problem in several metropolitan areas in developing ountries, but also in Eu-
ropean ountries. In Paris and London it is hard to get into the metro or loal
ommuter trains in urban areas at peak times. As a onsequene, passengers
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may hange their departure time, their route or mode in order to avoid exes-
sive ongestion. These hanges are ostly, the transit authority has diulties
to assoiate a money value to those osts.
Many metropolitan areas have adopted a seond best low prie poliy to
attrat ar users into publi transportation. This poliy an be justied (f.
Parry and Small, 2009; Proost and Van Dender, 2008), but the neessary a-
paity deisions alling upon publi revenues have not always been adopted and
this resulted in severe ongestion in mass transit. In this paper, we fous on the
haraterization of ongestion in mass transit.
Note that there are very few studies of ongestion in mass transit while
there are many studies of ongestion in private transportation. This may be
understood in the US where the use of publi transport is typially low exept
in some ities like New York and Boston. But this is more diult to understand
for European ities where the fration of ommuters an exeed 50% in the peak
period.
There is a long tradition in dealing with road ongestion. The so-alled
BPR formula - Bureau of Publi Roads - is now the standard in the literature.
But the miro-eonomi theory of mass transit has not dealt frequently with
rowding and riding omfort. There are only a few exeptions in the literature.
Among those let us mention the pioneering ontribution of Kraus (1991), where
a distintion is made between the value of time for standing and for seated
passengers. Kraus and Yoshida (2002) fous on the ongestion on the rail plat-
form where passengers may have to wait for several trains before they an enter.
Several papers have integrated ongestion in publi transport in a multi-modal
model but treat this important issue in a simplied way. Huang (2000) has om-
fort osts linearly inreasing in the number of users and Rouwendal and Verhoef
(2004) have rowding as an inreasing funtion of oupany ratio. Many em-
pirial studies onrmed the importane of disomfort onditions in rail (see
Wardman and Whelan (2011)). Vuhi (2005), provides a major ontribution
to the reent theory of transit but does not expliitly deal with rowding in
urban transit. Jara-Díaz and Gshwender (2005) oers an informal disussion
of rowding. Initial papers dealing with rail (and bus) transport were mainly
onerned by the optimal servie frequeny and vehile apaity (f. Mohring,
1972; Jansson, 1980; Rietveld et al., 2001). An approah of ongestion in publi
transportation based on multi-prize ontests, has been proposed reently by de
Palma and Soumyanetra (2012).
The value of time (VOT) in mass transit depends on riding onditions. There
are mainly three dierent situations a passenger may fae:
• A seat is available, and in that ase the value of time an be assumed to
be independent of the number of passengers in the vehile.
• The passenger has to stand but the vehile is not rowded. In that ase
the VOT will be higher but again onstant.
• The passenger has to stand and there are too many passengers in the
vehile. In that ase the VOT, or the riding onditions, would depend on
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the number of passengers.
Similar situations were onsidered in Lam et al. (1999), where they distinguish
between three disrete situations in their empirial analysis. The development
of tratable miro-eonomi theory that inludes riding omfort and rowding
in mass transit ould benet from a mathematial expression reeting these
alternative omfort situations. Our paper deals only with the stylized ase of a
homogeneous population that wants to make a xed number of trips between an
origin and a destination but an be generalized to the ase of variable demand for
trips, to the ase of a network and to the ase of a heterogeneous population. It
oers also new options to plan and better optimize the apaity of mass transit.
To the best of our knowledge, publi transportation ongestion is not modeled
in ommerial software whih desribes publi and private transportation. The
funtional form we propose may help to remedy this situation. It is simple,
tratable and an be explained intuitively.
In the next setion we propose the disomfort funtion and analyze its prop-
erties. In Setion 3, we use our formulation to analyze the properties of user
equilibrium and optimal sheduling and priing in a dynami mass transit model
for the ase of a uniform desired arrival time. In Setion 4, the disomfort for-
mulation is used to analyze the sheduling in the ase of a randomly distributed
desired arrival time. In Setion 5, we disuss possible generalizations.
2 Dening disomfort funtions in mass transit
Time ost in publi transit depends on riding onditions. The most omfortable
situation is when a passenger has a seat. Not having a seat is not enjoyable but
aeptable when there is no rowding and the trip is not too long. Disomfort
beomes partiularly important when too many passengers have to stand.
Most important notation and assumed numerial values are provided in Ta-
ble 1. Let ns denote the number of seats in the vehile and let nx denote the
standing apaity. The standing apaity is sometimes dened by the manu-
faturer of the bus or by the regulating authority. But it is often exeeded at
peak times. Vuhi (2005) distinguishes between ve situations that range from
independent standing, easy irulation when passenger density is less than
one by one meter square to rashes loads, possible injuries fored movements
when there are 6.7 passengers per meter square (f. Vuhi, 2005, Table 1.2,
page 12). Of ourse these standards vary when some passengers are arrying
some luggages or strollers. We assume that the standing apaity still allows
passengers to travel in omfortable onditions. What matters here is not how
it is dened but that the disomfort of standing is inreasing with the number
of passengers. So, the total seating and omfortable standing apaity of the
vehile is ns + nx. We dene user osts for a given standard trip that takes a
given time. The user ost of the nth passenger, is given by
C(n) =
{
α0 if n ≤ n
s
α1 + b e
c(n−ns−nx)
if n > ns,
(1)
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Figure 1: In-vehile average ost for the passengers (based on values in Table 1).
where b and c are positive parameters that reet how rowding impats time
ost. The user ost for those who an sit is α0. The user ost for the passenger
that have to stand is given by the seond line in (1). It is equal to α1, where
α0 < α1, unless n > n
x + ns (the vehile is rowded) and then it inreases
strongly. The total ost orresponding to (1) is
TC(n) =
{
nα0 if n ≤ n
s
ns α0 +
(
α1 + b e
c(n−ns−nx)
)
(n− ns) if n > ns.
(2)
The average ost is AC(n) = TC(n)/n, and the marginal soial ost is obtained
by dierentiation of (2) with respet to n, i.e. SC(n) = d TC(n)/d n, exept at
point n = ns where it is not dened. These funtions are illustrated on Figure 1.
Notie that both C(n) and SC(n) are disontinuous at point ns, and dened
using a onditional statement. In pratie a ontinuous formulation is generally
preferred, whenever possible. In Appendix A, we disuss possible issues on how
to approximate Eq. 1 with a smooth funtion.
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For n < ns+nx and a positive value of parameter c the term with exponential
is very small and an be negleted. As the number of passengers inreases and
beomes higher than the apaity of the vehile (ns + nx), rowding inreases
and this is aptured in the exponential term.
If there are less than ns passengers then they all have a seat and the marginal
passenger ontributes to total travel ost by α0. If the number of passengers
is between ns and nx, the marginal soial ost is almost onstant and equal to
α1. For more than n
x
passengers the marginal soial ost inreases reeting
rowding and the diulty to get into the vehile. Notie that user ost is not
the same for all passengers: those who have a seat have lower travel ost.
1
Instead of the term exp(c (n−ns−nx)) in Eq. 1 one ould use exp(c max(n−ns−nx, 0)).
Appendix B shows that both formulations lead to similar impats.
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Parameter Comment Illustrative value
α0 VOT with seat 6 ($/hour)
α1 VOT without seat 9 ($/hour)
β Early arrival penalty 5 ($/hour)
γ Late arrival penalty 12 ($/hour)
ns Number of seats 20 (seat)
nx Standing apaity (legal) 30 (passenger)
ns + nx Vehile apaity (legal) 50 (passenger)
b, c Disomfort parameters (0.3, 0.3)
ti Departure time of train i 
T Travel time 0.25 (hour)
Table 1: Parameter values.
3 User equilibrium, sheduling and optimal pri-
ing with idential desired arrival time
In this setion we explore optimal sheduling and priing in a simple dynami
model where some users want to travel via mass transit from one origin to a
given destination. We study rst the simpler ase of idential desired arrival
times.
The objetive is to illustrate how rowding in rail or bus system forms in
peak hours. On the side of passengers, we assume a group of N individuals who
have the same desired arrival time window (t, t), and who inur a shedule delay
ost whenever they arrive too early (before time t) or too late (after time t) at
their destination. Let t denote the atual arrival time of a given passenger. We
onsider the following penalty funtion:
f(t) =

(t− t)β if t < t
0 if t < t < t
(t− t) γ if t > t,
(3)
where β and γ are the shedule delay parameters, respetively, for early and
late arrival. It is usually assumed that β < γ, i.e. the penalty of an early
arrival is lower than the penalty of a late arrival. When the travel speed in
the rail system is onstant, we an assume without loss of generality that the
arrival times are also the departure times of the train. As in Kraus and Yoshida
(2002), we assume suessive departures of the train at times ti = t+ δ i, where
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i = . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , and δ is the tehnial time interval between two
departures. Denote by ni the number of passengers that selet the train at
time ti. We take a simple onguration where all passengers take the train in
the same (single) station and have the same destination. We disuss the user
equilibrium, the system optimum and the optimal priing ase.
3.1 User equilibrium
At a user equilibrium, eah passenger's objetive is to minimize his own travel
ost plus shedule delay ost, alled generalized user ost. If there is no rowding
(unlimited apaity) then the best solution for all passengers is to take a train
that departs in time interval (t, t). With rowding, eah passenger will trade o
the shedule delay ost with disomfort ost to selet the best departure time.
At equilibrium no passenger will have an inentive to hange his departure time.
The individuals will not take into aount their external osts, so that the user
equilibrium may dier from the system optimum. The total in-vehile ost in
train i is TC(ni), and the average ost is TC(ni)/ni, where ni the loading of
train i. Taking into aount the shedule delay ost, the generalized user ost in
train i is C(ni)+f(ti). At equilibrium no passenger has an inentive to swith to
another train and this obtains when generalized user osts are equalized among
all trains. Formally, we have
C(ni) + f(ti) = c,
where c is the generalized user ost in all the trains.2
3.2 System optimum
The optimum distribution of users over trains minimizes total transport ost,
i.e.
∑
i (TC(ni) + f(ti)ni), where ni represents the number of users of the
train leaving at time ti. Travel ost onsidered here is based on the MAS ost
funtion given in (1) that represents the disomfort osts as a funtion of arrival
order. Total number of users is xed and we have
∑k
i=1 ni = N . The optimal
oupany rate in eah train is determined so that total osts are minimized.
We an formulate this problem as an unonstrained minimization program if
we substitute for nk =
∑k−1
i=1 ni. If the optimum solution is an interior solution
where ni > n
s
, we an use rst-order ondition for a given train i (where
i = 1, . . . , k − 1), that is
SC(ni) + f(ti) = SC(nk) + f(tk).
2
If there are k trains, i = 1 . . . k, we have a system of k+1 nonlinear equations: k equations,
one for eah train stating C(ni) + f(ti) = c, plus the ondition that eah user hooses only
one train n1 + · · · + nk = N . The unknowns are the train loadings ni and the generalized
travel ost c. To nd a solution to this problem, it sues to solve the rst k equations by
onsidering c as a parameter, and then nd the value of c that yields the ondition on the
total number of users. The solution is learly unique.
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This ondition implies that, at the optimum, the marginal ost of a new pas-
senger in-vehile i is equal to the marginal soial gain obtained from removing
the same user from vehile k. The optimality onditions form a set of n − 1
non-linear equations that an be solved numerially. We illustrate the user
equilibrium and the system optimum in Table 2 using again the parameters of
Table 1. Remember that in-vehile travel ost is C(n) · T , where T is the travel
time, here equal to 15 minutes. In the same table we also illustrate the solution
where the users are distributed uniformly over the trains (one third of the total
population in eah train).
The dierene between the user equilibrium and the system optimum is the
suboptimal alloation of users over vehiles. The system optimum is to load
the trains arriving too early or on time more or less like the trains arriving too
late and the oupany rate is not too dierent from uniform (ompare rst
and third lines in Table 2). There are two fores in play: disomfort in the
vehile and shedule delay ost. The optimal solution reahes the best trade o
between these two fores. The redution of shedule delay ost made possible
by loading more passengers on the rst trains is limited by the rowding it will
indue. Sine early delay ost is smaller than late delay ost in the example of
Table 3 (rst line) there are more passengers in the rst train than in the third
one.
Consider now the user equilibrium. Users will make eorts to improve their
omfort and will try to minimize the user ost also by piking the wrong train.
They disregard the extra in-vehile omfort osts they generate for the other
users. This leads to too full trains that arrive too early and just in time. In
the example of Table 2 (line 2) there is more rowding in the rst and seond
train and muh less passengers in the third one. This suboptimal distribution
of passengers over the trains leads to a muh higher total travel ost.
Comparing the uniform distribution of passengers over trains (third line)
with the system optimum tells us that, in our example, the ineient alloation
over trains is less important in terms of eieny than the eorts of the users
to improve their in-vehile omfort. In this ase, the travel ost in equilibrium
is higher by more than 35% than the ost obtained with the optimal loadings
of the trains. The travel ost in the uniform distribution is higher only by less
than 3%.
Notie however that the uniform distribution will not be as good as in this
illustration if the total population were smaller and apaity not fully used. In
that ase it is natural to lower ost by putting more passengers in the middle
train sine shedule delay ost is redued but rowding is not inreased. A
similar point is disussed below in Setion 4.2 below.
3
3.3 Optimal priing
The soure of ineieny is the ineient alloation of passengers over the
dierent trains. This requires a dierentiation of the harges for the dierent
3
The interested reader may hek the Mathematia notebook aompanying this paper
that we make available from http://perso.univ-lille3.fr/~mkilani/odes/
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Train loadings Average osts
1 2 3 C SD Total
−30 mins on time +30 mins ($/day/passenger)
System Optimum 53.5 55.1 41.4 2.08 1.70 3.78
User Equilibrium 61.5 63.3 25.3 3.75 1.36 5.11
Uniform 50.0 50.0 50.0 1.99 1.89 3.88
Table 2: Train loading and user osts under three alternatives (parameters from
Table 1). Abbreviations: C stands for rowding, and SD for shedule delay.
Travel time is 15 minutes.
trains so that the system optimum ondition is satised
C(ni) + f(ti) = C(nk) + f(tk), i = 1 . . . , k − 1.
In order to internalize the rowding externalities we need to harge more the
trains with more rowding or alternatively those trains with the best arrival
times.
4 User equilibrium, sheduling and optimal pri-
ing with randomly distributed desired arrival
times
We turn now to the more general ase where passengers dier in their desired
arrival time. We onsider a uniform distribution as it allows to derive analytial
expressions. We start by studying the passenger hoie faing two departure
times tA and tB both loated in time interval (0, 1) and tA < tB. Next we
optimize the departure times for multiple trains, and disuss priing alternatives.
In order to simplify mathematial expressions, we assume that the travel time
is set equal to one.
4.1 User equilibrium and system optimum with 2 trains
Consider the hoie between two trains. Train A leaves at tA ∈ (0, 1), while train
B leaves at tB where tA < tB < 1. Assume that travel times are normalized to
zero (onstant travel speed), and that the desired arrival times are ontinuously
distributed in (0, 1), with density ρ. We rst ompute the equilibrium average
user osts for any tA, tB. In a seond step we optimize the departure times. For
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an equilibrium it is neessary that the last entrant is indierent between the
two trains. Denote the departure time of the user indierent between the two
trains A and B by t∗. The most interesting ase is where t∗ ∈ (tA, tB). The
number of users of train A is ρ t∗. The generalized ost of user t∗ is:
CGA = C (nA) + β (t
∗ − tA)
= C (ρ t∗) + β (t∗ − tA) .
Similarly, the generalized ost for using train B, is
CGB = C (nB) + γ (tB − t
∗)
= C (ρ (1− t∗)) + γ (tB − t
∗) .
The indierene ondition for a user equilibrium reads:
C (ρt∗) + β (t∗ − tA) = C (ρ (1− t
∗)) + γ (tB − t
∗) (4)
or, (β + γ) t∗ = γtB + βtA + C (ρ (1− t
∗))− C (ρt∗) .
The form of C(n) preludes a general analytial solution but we an inspet
its properties numerially, as illustrated in Figure 2(a). The ase of a small
small enough ρ (when all passengers have a seat and inur the same travel ost)
an be omputed expliitly, sine then C (ρ t∗) → α0 and C (ρ (1− t
∗)) → α0.
Therefore, in this ase, equation (4) redues to:
β (t∗ − tA) = γ (tB − t
∗)
t∗ =
γtB + βtA
(β + γ)
.
For γ > β, we have t∗ < 1/2. The reason is that transit users prefer to be one
minute too early rather than one minute too late. γ > β is the usual assumption
and is empirially sound. This is the solution when ongestion (rowding) does
not matter (ρ = 0). As the density parameter ρ inreases there will be more
and more passengers in train B. We hek from (4) that
dnA
dρ
< 0, if
γtB + βtA
(β + γ)
> 0.5,
and at the limit we have limρ→1 t̂
∗ = 0.5, where t̂∗ denotes desired arrival time
with rowding for the passenger indierent between train A and train B. As
expeted, the eet of rowding is to equalize the number of users in eah train.
This statement also means that an inrease of total demand for mass transit
will derease the number of users of train A if train A transports already more
than 50% of total demand.
In Figure 2(a) the two urves orrespond to the number of users in train A,
under equilibrium and optimal regimes. When, the number of users is small (by
omparison to the vehile apaity) external osts are small and the equilibrium
outome is optimal. As the number of users inreases, the omfort dereases,
9
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(b) Optimum priing of train A.
Figure 2: Comparison of optimum and equilibrium when tA = 0.2 and tB = 0.8
and other parameters from Table 1.
still, train A remains overused sine eah user onsiders his own ost, not the
external rowding ost imposed on the other passengers. As the number of
users ontinues to inrease, rowding beomes the main onern and passengers
are almost equally split between the two trains, both at equilibrium and at the
optimum. This gure, however, hides a partiular detail. From the fat that
equilibrium loadings onverge to optimum, one may onlude that priing is no
longer required in this ase, or more preisely that optimum priing of train A
is pA → 0, as ρ gets larger. This is a false onlusion. Indeed, optimum priing
is inreasing in ρ as shown in Figure 2(b). The reason is that as the number of
passengers inreases, rowding inreases strongly. Even if the dierene in the
two quantities is small, it still indues an inreasing dierential in ost. At the
same time, one must be areful in the pratial impliation of this theoretial
result. Indeed, in pratie the number of passengers is integer, so when two
quantities are lose it means that they are equal, and indeed no priing is needed
to adjust quantities. In the next setion we study optimal departure times and
show that with optimized departure times and uniformly distributed arrival
times, prie dierentiation over time is again not needed.
4.2 Optimal departure times for k trains
For an early study of optimal time tables see de Palma and Lindsey (2001).
We treat the ase of a single train. Total number of users is xed and so is
the rowding disomfort and it plays no role in the optimization omputation.
The total shedule delay ost is:
∫ tA
0
γ(tA − t)g(t)dt+
∫ 1
tA
β(t− tA)g(t)dt. The
minimum ost is obtained at departure time tA that satises
β ·N early = γ ·N late, (5)
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where N early =
∫ 1
tA
g(t)dt, where N late =
∫ tA
0 g(t)dt, denotes the number of
passengers that arrive after their desired arrival time. When g(t) is uniform
over (0, 1), we get a simple solution: γ tA = β (1− tA). Solving this equation
for tA we nd that the train should depart at time β/(β + γ). With k trains,
the same optimal solution applies in eah subinterval. The rst order ondition
for a maximum gives the optimal departure time ti (for i = 1 . . . k), that is
tunifi =
1
k
[
β
β + γ
+ (i− 1)
]
. (6)
The main result is that when users only dier in their preferred arrival time
and the distribution of preferred arrival times is uniform, rowding does not
modify the optimal departure times. Notie however that when the distribution
of desired arrival times is not uniform, this result no longer holds.
For the sake of omparison, onsider this alternative nonuniform distribution
of desired arrival times.
h(t) =

4 ρ t if 0 ≤ t ≤ 1/2,
4 ρ (1− t) if 1/2 < t ≤ 1,
0 elsewhere.
(7)
Notie that
∫ 1
0 g(t)dt = ρ, so we have the same number of users as in the ase of
a uniform distribution. With distribution h(t), most users have desired arrival
time near 1/2. With only one train, Eq. (5) still applies, sine there will be ρ
passengers in the train independently of its departure time. Using this ondition
and the rst order ondition leads to
th1 =
β
β +
√
β(2γ − β)
,
and we hek that for β < γ, T g ∈ (0, 1/2).
With two trains and more, we an no longer use ondition (5). Instead, total
user ost should be minimized with respet to departure times of the two trains.
Let SD(tA, tB) denote total shedule delay ost for all users when the departure
times of the two trains are at tA and tB, respetively. The optimal departure
times minimize total ost TC(nA) + TC(nB) + SD(tA, tB), where nA and nB
denote the number of passengers in the rst and seond train, respetively.
Notie that these train loadings depend on departure times tA and tB. Indeed,
for any given tA and tB one has to nd the user who is indierent between the
two trains in order to ompute nA and nB. A solution to this problem annot
be derived analytially, given the nonlinear expression of C(n), but may be
solved using a numerial proedure. For a numerial illustration,
4
omputing the
solution with distribution h(t) dened above and parameter values in Table 1,
we nd the solution values given in the seond olumn in Table 3. Users are
almost split equally between the two trains (t = .499) and we hek, as expeted,
that tunif1 < t
h
1 < t
h
2 < t
unif
2 .
4
The omputational details are given in the Mathematia notebook. See footnote
3
.
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Optimizing over tA and tB with
same fares (pA = pB) optimized pA and pB = 0
Average ost 8.68 7.61
tA 0.276 0.256
tB 0.587 0.558
t 0.499 0.472
% arriving late 31.38 29
pA  1.439
Table 3: Optimizing over departure times and fares.
4.3 Optimal priing for k trains
We know that optimal priing depends in priniple on the departure times as
they determine the levels of ongestion and the external ongestion osts. In a
few ases, pries do not matter. When there is only one train, ongestion level is
xed and pries do not matter as long as total demand is xed. More generally,
for any set of departure times, optimal pries are always equal to the marginal
external ongestion osts. When total demand is xed only the dierenes in
marginal external ongestion osts of the dierent trains matters. Also, with
a uniform distribution of desired arrival times there is no need for priing to
deentralize the optimum. Indeed, in this ase, departure times are given by
Eq. 6 and there are ρ/n passengers in eah train. One an hek that users with
desired arrival time at i/n are indierent between train i − 1 and train i. So,
the private deision leads to the optimal hoie.
Then, to disuss the ase of nonuniform distribution of arrival times, we
onsider the ase of two trains. Desired departure times distribution is g(t)
over (0, 1). Total passenger ost has two parts: shedule delay ost and in-
vehile ost whih depend on the loadings. Let NA and NB denote passengers
in trains A and B, respetively. Let the fares5 in the two trains be pA and pB,
respetively, and let the train loadings be determined by NA = ρ
∫ t˜
0 g(t)dt and
NB = ρ
∫ 1
t˜
g(t)dt, where t ∈ (0, 1). The soial planner an hoose t˜ by setting
fares pA and pB onveniently. Given t˜, the departure times of the two trains
an be determined on the basis of ondition 5, respetively applied on (0, t˜) and
5
When demand is not elasti, only one train need to be pried, with a value that may be
positive or negative. So in this disussion one may assume that pA = 0 and only onsider
fares on train B.
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(t˜, 1). Now let
t˜∗ = argmax
t˜
S˜D(t˜),
where S˜D(t˜) is total shedule delay ost for all passengers (in the two trains)
where fares are set to make passenger t˜ indierent between the two trains and
where the departure times are based on ondition 5 as explained above. So, t˜∗
indiates the train loadings that yield the minimum total shedule delay ost.
Fares pA and pB obtained under this solution would be optimal fares when
rowding in the vehiles is not onsidered.
Crowding is minimized when all the passengers are equally split between the
two trains. If we start from the situation where only shedule delay ost matters
and inrease progressively the importane of rowding, the marginal passenger
moves from t˜ to the median passenger t (we have
∫ t
0
g(t)dt =
∫ 1
t
g(t)dt = 1/2).
A numerial illustration is given in the last olumn of Table 3. Comparing
with the situation where the optimization of pries is not possible we see that
departures times are slightly advaned. There are more passengers in the seond
train, and this allows more passengers to arrive earlier. Average user ost is (of
ourse) smaller when pries are optimized.
6
5 Conlusion
This paper has developed an analytial expression for the disomfort in mass
transit. Our expression distinguishes between passengers with a seat and those
who have to stand. For those who have to stand, the disomfort will depend
on the number of standing passengers ompared to the apaity of the vehile.
This formulation helps to derive optimal timetables and optimal user harges.
The model presented in this paper is very simple and many improvements an
be envisaged. In partiular, we have omitted the waiting time and the fat
that when a train arrives, heavily ongestion, only a fration of passengers
are able to enter. The remaining passengers have to wait for the next train,
inurring an extra waiting time. For empirial appliations, the parameters
of the model should be estimated in order to derive a ongestion funtion for
publi transportation, omparable to the BPR funtion widely used for private
transportation.
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A Approximation of the MAS formula
A drawbak of the MAS formula disussed in this paper is that it is not ontin-
uous at point ns. Also, the onditional statement in denition (1) may lead to a
ompliations in the pratial implementation of the MAS formula. Whenever
possible a smooth funtion is preferred. A ontinuous alternative may be ob-
tained by replaing the original funtion by a good approximation. We disuss
here how one an onstrut a funtion ψ that approximates the user ost given
in Eq. (1).
There are several approximation proedures and tehniques available. These
are generally simple to apply to unidimensional funtions. We use two standard
tehniques, a simple Chebyshev interpolating polynomials and a sophistiated
implementation in Mathematia.
7
Both of these solutions are illustrated on
Figure 3.
For Chebyshev polynomials, we have used the standard proedure as given
in Algorithm 6.2 in Judd (1998). Let us denote this approximation funtion by
ψc. The result shown in Fig. 3(a) withm = 150 (number of interpolation points)
and n = 50 (polynomial degrees). The approximation quality remains poor, due
mainly to the disontinuity at ns. Inreasing further the number of interpolation
points does not improve the quality of the approximation. Inreasing the degree
of the interpolating algorithm leads to an instability in the output funtion and
makes the omputation muh more ompliate. The quality of this approxima-
tion is not good, and there are two problems. For some values of n, partiularly
around ns, the values it generates aren't lose to those of C(n). This an be
onrmed by measuring the error approximation
∫ 60
0 |C(n) − ψ
c(n)|dn. The
seond problem is that an equation of the form ψc(n) = A, where A is positive
number may have more than one solution (depending on the values of A). This
ours beause the approximation here does not preserve the monotoniity of
C(n). Denitely ψc is not a good hoie for the approximation of C(n).
The sophistiated approximation is denoted ψl. Fig. 3(b) shows both C and
ψl. In this ase we obtain a better approximation. In partiular, The error
between the approximation and the original funtion is small. It is lear that
ψs(n) ts the original funtion C(n) muh better than ψc. This observation
may be onrmed by omputing the error measure
∫ 60
0 |C(n)− ψ
s(n)|dn.
7
The latter uses divided dierenes to onstrut Lagrange or Hermite interpolating poly-
nomials.
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(b) ψ(n) formulation or interpolation.
Figure 3: Approximation of user ost funtion.
The expliit formula is atually a quiet long expression that an be handled
by omputers but not really useful for diret analytial usage. We an, however,
provide a relatively simple formula that is omparable with respet to the error
generated to the seond approximation provided above. Indeed using the same
notation as above, the funtion given by
ψMAS(n) = α0 +
α1 − α0
1 + ea(ns−n)
+ b ec (n−n
s
−nx)
(8)
is a good approximation for the user ost as dened by Eq. 1. It is omparable
to the funtion ψs(n) dened above but has the merit of being very simple and
avoids all onditional expressions. Apart, the problem of multiple solutions (as
disussed for the ase of ψs) it ould be used for pratial purposes.
B Comparison with max funtion
The formulation in Eq. 1 uses the exponential form to take into aount the
fat that loadings below ns + nx does not generate rowding. One may won-
der whether we an replae the term b exp(c (n − ns − nx)) by the simpler
b exp(c max(n−ns−nx), 0). Figure 4 shows that both expressions give similar
urves for user ost and average ost (the dashed urve is the one using the max
funtion).
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Figure 4: Comparison with initial formulation (bold urves) and max formula-
tion (dashed urves) .
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